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ABSTRACT
Austerity has become a key term in economic and social policy 
debates. Although austerity has been contested both in terms of 
economic theory and policy-making, it has been remarkably resilient. 
This resilience has been explained, for example, in structural and 
institutional terms by the rise of the ‘debt state’. Other explanations 
have emphasised the strength of austerity ideas rooted in ‘ordo-liberal’ 
economic theory. Following the insights of science technology 
scholarship and its emphasis on the social co-production of 
authoritative knowledge, this article proposes a stronger focus on 
organisations and their links across nation state borders for an 
explanation of the stability of austerity capitalism and the thinking 
underpinning it. The scrutiny of think tank networks, the article 
proposes, can help bridge the gap between ideational and structural 
explanations.
Highlights
•  While many think tanks which promote austerity perspectives are based in 
Germany, many more are scattered across the European Union
•  Austerity think tanks are common to three centre-right European Parliament 
political parties and their partisan think tank networks
•  Think tank networks provide for ideational and personal links across the 
centre-right political spectrum
•  Transnational interlocks across think tank networks are more common in 
centre-right groups than in centre-left groups
•  Many intellectuals with interlocking positions in two or more think tanks across 
centre-right networks are also members of the Mont Pelerin Society
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1. Introduction
Economic experts play an increasingly important role in policy-making across the world 
(Rodgers, 2011). However, politicians find it difficult to decide which kind of economic 
expertise they can trust. Although economics is frequently said to suffer from ‘group think’, 
economists come from different schools of thought and engage in substantial controversies. 
Why certain schools of economic thought emerge from these struggles with more authority 
– and therefore with more influence on policy-makers – than others is not easily explained. 
The ‘strange non-death of neoliberalism’ (Crouch, 2011) and the survival of the ‘dangerous 
idea’ (Blyth, 2013) of austerity despite the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/08 and the ensu-
ing Great Recession, however, are examples which show that some schools of economic 
thought remain hegemonic despite sustained contestation. Despite significant criticism of 
the post-crisis emphasis on consolidation of public finances, supply side-oriented austerity 
perspectives focusing on spending cuts rather than tax increases dominate European public 
policy-making. Austerity politics can take different forms. For example, austerity can be 
viewed narrowly as simply a focus on balanced budgets (Anderson & Minneman, 2014). 
Wider definitions encompass the realisation that austerity politics, since the 1970s, has 
included concerted efforts to reverse the expansion of the welfare state. Following Evans and 
McBride austerity today could be defined ‘as (1) comprising fiscal consolidation, (2) struc-
tural reforms of the public sector and (3) flexibilization of the labour markets’ (2017, p. 8).
The role of economic experts and their policy advice in how the hegemony of ‘austerian 
thinking’ has been achieved and maintained has so far not been subject to sufficient sys-
tematic scrutiny. Some research points to Germany and to its supposedly monolithic neo-
liberal economics profession (Matthijs & McNamara, 2015). This view underestimates the 
diversity among Germany’s economists (Hagemann, 2008) and cannot explain, for example, 
the support for austerity in the United Kingdom (UK). While Thomas Medvetz (2012) has 
established the relevance of right-wing think tanks in changing the terms of the welfare 
state debate in the United States, there is to date no comparable analysis of the European 
landscape of think tanks. Indeed, a research focus on think tank networks can shed light on 
the ways in which certain economic and social policy perspectives and expertise become 
relevant. Empirically, such a focus can provide insight into a broad range of pro-austerity 
forces – operating within and across national borders – which are responsible for strength-
ening austerity capitalism in Europe. Theoretically, a focus on think tank networks adds 
a transnational and organisational dimension to existing theoretical explanations of aus-
terity capitalism. So far most research has emphasised structural and ideational features 
of austerity regimes, but has paid little attention to the mediating role which organisations 
have come to play both with regard to the structure-agency puzzle and to the relationship 
of interests and ideas.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines two theoretical approaches to 
austerity politics in order to set the context. Section 3 discusses method and approach 
underlying the research presented in the article. Contrary to the popular ‘two communities’ 
perspective of experts and decision-makers (Caplan, 1979), both the links between think 
tanks and the ties between academic, consulting, media, business and political actors reveal 
how (austerity) expert knowledge is the outcome of social co-production (Jasanoff, 2006). 
Section 4 provides the historical context to the present configuration of European austerity 
capitalism and sets the stage for the following analysis of think tank networks. Section 5 
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introduces six European foundations and think tank networks created by European polit-
ical parties since 2010. These networks are analysed with regard to the think tanks that 
are active in the economic and social policy field. This analysis highlights pro-austerity 
networks which are part of three centre-right political formations. Section 6 introduces to 
the analysis two partisan think tank networks on the market-liberal and conservative right 
end of the political spectrum which also feature pro-austerity perspectives. In combination, 
the analysis of the five different think tank networks allows making visible a wide range of 
austerity think tanks in Europe. Section 7 presents a discussion of the results and points to 
the limits of the research focus on think tank networks. Finally, the conclusion revisits the 
theoretical controversy on austerity capitalism and the particular relevance of think tank 
networks in its survival.
2. Explaining austerity: structure vs. ideas?
The advent of austerity capitalism arguably sparked a revival of structural approaches to 
the study of contemporary international political economy. Wolfgang Streeck has gone 
further than others to explain the configuration of austerity capitalism by way of pointing 
to the fundamental contradictions between capitalism and democracy. Streeck empirically 
traces back the transition from the ‘taxation state’ to the ‘debt state’ to the late 1980s, first in 
the United States and then in Europe. According to Streeck, in this transition, public debt 
models and increasing budget deficits give way to private household borrowing and increas-
ing private debt. In spite of the efforts to consolidate public finances, necessary bailouts of 
financial institutions have led to further public debt and to and inevitable undermining of 
democratic decision-making. For Streeck, the resulting move since the mid-1970s towards 
‘fiscal consolidation’ was underpinned by an ideological shift from Keynes to Hayek. In this 
context, Streeck makes one of his very few references to the role of experts and ideas in this 
process as he discusses Friedrich August von Hayek’s 1936 paper on interstate federalism 
as a blueprint for the later construction of the European Union (Streeck, 2013). Hayek’s 
ideas amount to a rigid version of competitive federalism allowing negative economic inte-
gration, i.e. the removal of obstacles of cross-border economic activity, but undermining 
positive integration pertaining to fiscal federalism and cross-border solidarity. But Streeck 
dedicates little space to a discussion of the role and relevance of policy-related research and 
its producers. His explanation of austerity and the consolidation state relies mostly on the 
structural and institutional dimensions of capitalist development.
Mark Blyth (2013) takes a different approach and traces the history of the ‘dangerous 
idea’ of austerity back to the early modern state to highlight the moral dimension of public 
debt discussions (see also Schui, 2014). Most relevant for today’s age of austerity capitalism 
are his thoughts on German and also Italian ordo-liberalism and Austrian school of eco-
nomics. Blyth refers to monetarism, public choice theory and the critique of democracy 
from a public finance perspective as ‘enablers’ of the austerity project (Blyth, 2013, 152). 
With the crisis of 2007/08, older forms of austerity policy orientations that relied on incre-
mental change and new instruments were considered insufficient. A regime of permanent 
austerity and the constitutionalisation of austerity (McBride, 2016) ushered in ‘third order’ 
paradigmatic change (Hall, 1993).
Blyth offers a very important insight into the history of various intellectual streams 
of austerity ideas. These are, however, more interconnected than his work captures. It is 
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important to recognise that the apparently different German, Italian, Austrian, Chicago and 
Virginia strands of austerity thinking came together in the transnational intellectual circle of 
the Mont Pelerin Society, founded by von Hayek and others in 1947 (Burgin, 2012; Walpen, 
2004). In other words, the ideas examined by Blyth are even more significant for an expla-
nation of the international expansion and variety of austerity capitalism if the transnational 
networks responsible for generating and diffusing austerity policy are taken into account.
This article proposes that a closer analysis specifically of think tank networks, involved 
in economic and social policy advice, can shed light on possible patterns and hierarchies of 
public policy experts and their expertise. Such an analysis helps bridging the gap between 
the history of economic thought related to austerity ideas and the structural and institutional 
analysis of austerity capitalism. Ideally, all European think tanks involved in economic and 
social policy should be examined for such analysis. However, such a systematic study is 
difficult to undertake due to the significant number of think tanks in Europe. Nonetheless, 
the analysis, as presented in this article, of all European think tank networks around six 
European political party foundations (Dakowska, 2009) from left to right and of two further 
transnational partisan networks with particular relevance to the austerity debate is a first 
step into the right direction.
3. Think tank (network) studies and research methods
Only recently has the literature on think tanks moved away from a traditional compara-
tive focus on nation states that has characterised the first generation of think tank studies 
(McGann & Weaver, 2000; Stone, Denham, & Garnett, 1998). Scholars point to the rise of 
transnational networks of (partisan) think tanks involved in policy research and consulting, 
both within countries and across borders (Kelstrup, 2016; Plehwe, Walpen, & Neunhöffer, 
2006). The internationalisation of policy-making has given rise to an increasingly interna-
tional supply and demand of policy expertise (Stone, 2013).
In contrast to traditional approaches to the analysis of expert influence in policy-mak-
ing, think tank studies informed by the ‘argumentative turn’ (Fischer & Foster, 1993) and 
by science and technology studies (Jasanoff, 2006; Strassheim, 2015) focus on the social 
and political dimension of knowledge and on the social co-production of expertise. This 
co-production involves policy experts and actors from political parties, but also actors 
from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), media and business. From this perspective, 
think tank experts cannot be simply considered to ‘speak truth to power’ or to ‘bridge the 
gap’ between scholars and decision-makers. Critical think tank (network) analysis must 
be aware of the instrumentality of think tanks, expressed in services such as ‘knowledge 
marketing’ and the legitimisation of certain policy perspectives (Stone, 2007). Medvetz 
(2012) has provided a historical analysis of the social co-production of knowledge and how 
specifically think tanks were in the field of welfare state transformation in the United States. 
The ‘shaping’ of harmful knowledge and knowledge manipulation efforts have been studied 
with regard to a wide range of environmental, public health and economic policy conflicts 
(Bonds, 2011; Mirowski, 2013; Oreskes & Conway, 2011). Such concerns over the strategic 
use of think tanks and ‘evidence’ to undermine solid and un-interested expertise have fuelled 
the development of the discipline of ‘agnotology studies’ (Proctor & Schiebinger, 2008).
Drawing from the literature on think tank networks, social co-production and ‘knowl-
edge-shaping’, the research presented here applies a specific think tank network studies 
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approach designed to systematically examine networks of organisations (think tanks and 
other), individuals (staff and board members) and ideas (normative and cognitive elements 
of knowledge; see Plehwe, 2015). Such networks can be formal or informal, or both. An 
analysis of who sits on think tank boards helps to reveal links to other organisations – inter 
alia, universities, corporations, NGOs, political parties, media companies – and thereby 
allows tracing of (often transnational) expert, consulting, lobby and advocacy networks or 
TECLANs. In contrast to formal social network analysis, the approach aims at the explora-
tion of large networks. Similar to explanatory social network analysis the aim is to clarify and 
recognise power positions and relative influence of individual actors such as think tanks and 
experts. In line with historical social network analysis, think tank network studies aim at the 
observation of emerging patterns and new social configurations (Padgett & Powell, 2012).
Based on the think tank network studies approach, we assume that relative positions of 
strength in the academic field and in policy conflicts can be considerably strengthened if 
they are reinforced by transfer capacities typically supplied by think tanks that link knowl-
edge production, dissemination and policy-making. In the case of austerity expertise, the 
analytical focus will first be on think tank networks related to the major European political 
parties. A second focus will be on partisan networks that are prominently involved in efforts 
to advance austerity perspectives.
The analysis of European think tank networks presented in this article is based on an 
extensive think tank network database that has been compiled from 2012 to 2015,1 on 
the analysis of think tank output to identify economic policy think tanks within the sam-
ple in general and think tanks promoting austerity perspectives in particular,2 as well as 
three interviews in 2012 and 2013 with think tank network officials at the right-wing New 
Direction Foundation (NDF), the European Liberal Forum (ELF) and the Green European 
Foundation (GEF).3
4. Contemporary austerity capitalism in historical perspective
Varieties of austerity politics in capitalist political economy have a long history (see Schui, 
2014). More recently, austerity politics was systematically employed in the wake of the 
Latin American debt crisis during the 1980s by way of lending conditionalities imposed 
by the International Monetary Fund (Blyth, 2013; IMF, 2013). These austerity orienta-
tions were subsequently extended to the OECD world. The foundation of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the European Union (EU) itself was premised on the ‘austerian’ 
Maastricht Criteria. These stipulated an absolute debt ceiling, a yearly deficit ceiling and low 
inflation targets (Stützle, 2013). On the basis of these criteria, since 1993, public finances 
of EU member states have been subordinated to public debt avoidance and reduction – at 
least in theory. In practice, many EU member states have violated the Maastricht criteria 
without meaningful consequences. However, such ‘pragmatic austerity’ politics have become 
subject to considerable controversy after the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/08.
1the data capture 190 think tanks from six party foundation networks and 155 think tanks from two conservative-neoliberal 
partisan networks; see tables 1 and 4. the source data are available at www.thinktanknetworkresearch.net.
2For details see below, Section 5.
3the interviews were conducted leading personnel from the foundations (tom Miers, executive director ndF; Susanne Hartig, 
executive director elF; Pierre Jonckheer, co-president GeF).
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When the financial crisis hit, the austerity orientation dominating EU and large parts of 
the rest of the Western world was suspended for only a short period of time. During 2008 and 
2009, governments in North America and Western Europe adopted stimulus plans. These 
amounted to spending increases of up to 3% of GDP (European Commission-International 
Institute for Labour Studies, 2011). However, in contrast to the US, the EU and its member 
states quickly returned to an austerity course that became even more rigid than before the 
crisis. Here, the ‘bailout’ programme for several member states of the Eurozone proved 
significant, as did the new economic governance regime adopted following the crisis. This 
new regime essentially reinforced the Maastricht Criteria to signal the end of the pragmatic 
austerity regime of the past. The rules laid out in the new regime of European economic 
governance (Schulten & Müller, 2012) have sought to ‘constitutionalise’ austerity measures, 
i.e. to enshrine them in national laws (McBride, 2016).
The impact of austerity has been uneven within and across European countries. The 
South and East have suffered more than the North, and weaker parts of the population have 
suffered more than those economically better situated (European Trade Union Institute, 
2016). Austerity measures were backed by studies claiming the existence of a ‘growth-com-
patible’ maximum level of public debt (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010) and that spending cuts 
have expansionary effects (Alesina & Perotti, 1995). These studies have been rejected, not 
least because of grave calculation flaws in the former and a biased case selection and inter-
pretation in the latter (Krugman, 2013). Thus, austerity has been criticised not only because 
it ‘has not worked’, but also because its foundational ideas do not add up (Blanchard & 
Leigh, 2013; Blyth, 2013; Della Porta, 2015; Schui, 2014). Yet, neither theoretical debates 
nor empirical evidence have led to a paradigm shift. This observation does not conform 
to standard ideas of scientific evolution which propose an incremental and paradigmatic 
knowledge change. Instead, it seems necessary to recognise the existence of competing 
thought collectives (Fleck, 1980) to explain the co-existence of competing truth claims. To 
account for the power of thought collectives, however, it is necessary to look beyond the 
power of (academic) policy knowledge and economic policy discourse. Indeed, the ways 
in which ideas and expertise become relevant in society in general and in policy-making 
in particular need to be studied. The central question arising here is how the ‘dangerous 
idea’ of austerity (Blyth, 2013) has been made immune to criticism, and who ‘feeds’ this 
idea in Europe? To answer this, policy-related research must be subjected to closer scrutiny.
5. European think tank networks: political party foundations and their think 
tank constituencies
Think tank networks have sprawled across Europe after the creation of EMU in 1993. A 
core driver of the proliferation of European networks of think tanks was the expansion of 
majority voting in the European Council and the extension of the co-decision procedure in 
the European Parliament to an ever-wider range of policy fields (Fligstein & McNichol, 1998; 
Kelstrup, 2016). An additional impulse for the formation of formal networks was provided 
by the European Commission. In response to the growing legitimacy concerns of the EU 
in the early 2000s, funding was provided to the parties in the European Parliament to set 
up ‘European political party foundations’. Since European parties – which, in the European 
Parliament, are composed of the member state parties of the same party family – lack finan-
cial and organisational resources for long-term thinking, political party foundations were 
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hoped to provide the right vehicle to leverage pro-European ideas and programmes from 
within the parties (Dakowska, 2009). Thus, since 2009, all European political parties with 
sufficient representation in the European Parliament have the right to establish a European 
political party foundation.
The European party foundations have differing modi operandi (Gagatek & Van Hecke, 
2011). For example, the Green European Foundation concentrates on organising seminars 
on European topics not covered by their national partner organisations. The European 
Liberal Forum concentrates on citizenship-oriented training efforts and the coordination 
of its members. The New Direction Foundation (NDF) promotes European-level cam-
paigns on the benefits of the free market, while the Transform Network of the European 
Left commits energy to campaigns against free trade agreements. The Social Democratic 
and Conservative Foundations are, financially speaking, the most powerful organisations 
as they are associated to the largest European parties. By 2017, six European political party 
foundations and think tank networks have been funded by the EU, covering the political 
spectrum from left to right with the exception of the most recent ultra-right European 
Alliance for Freedom party foundation (see Table 1).
Despite their differences, the six European party foundations share one characteristic. 
They all operate in conjunction with a think tank network constituted of institutions both 
from EU member states and from beyond.
For the research presented here, the output of all 190 think tanks was scrutinised to 
single out all publications relevant to the theme of ‘austerity’ for the period after the Global 
Financial Crisis (2012–2015). This includes blogs, policy papers, speeches and videos dealing 
with questions of public finance, economic and social policy-making. If organisations’ out-
put undoubtedly promoted pro-austerity perspectives, they were considered part of an ‘aus-
terity network’. Additional selection criteria were employed to increase the level of certainty 
with regard to the inclusion in the austerity network. The publications were required to (a) 
put forward a meta-theoretical defence of austerity, (b) propose austerity policies which were 
consistent with the general orientation of the think tank’s output and (c) to boast high-level 
authorship. Within the total of 190 think tanks belonging to six networks, 21 austerity think 
tanks were identified as associated to the networks of New Direction Foundation (NDF), 
Centre for European Studies (CES) and European Liberal Forum (ELF), respectively. These 
think tanks ranged from big German party foundations like the state-funded Christian 
Democratic Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Social Democratic Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
to small organisations such as Estat.cz in the Czech Republic. Table 2 provides an overview 
of the number and share of austerity think tanks in the six networks studied.
Table 1. european party foundations, european parties and related think tanks.
Source: own compilation based on data from 2015, details online at: www.thinktanknetworkresearch.net
Political party foundation European political party Think tank population
new direction Foundation (ndF) AECR (Conservatives and Reformists) 27
Wilfried Martens centre for european Studies (ceS) European People’s Party 30
european liberal Forum (elF) ALDE (Liberals) 38
Foundation for european Progressive Studies (FePS) Socialist & Democrats 51
Green european Foundation (GeF) European Green Party 17
transform! European Left Party 27
total   190
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The data show that austerity think tanks are exclusive to the liberal and conservative and 
centre-right political spectrum in Europe. None of the centre-left party-related think tanks 
featured austerity perspectives in their published output between 2012 and 2015.
The finding that 21 think tanks on the centre-right promote austerity perspectives may 
not be considered sufficient evidence for the prevalence of austerity in the New Direction 
Foundation (NDF), Centre for European Studies (CES) and European Liberal Forum (ELF) 
networks. However, there are surprisingly few think tanks in these centre-right networks 
that ‘do economic policy’. When they have such a specialism, without exception they pro-
mote pro-austerity perspectives. These austerity think tanks thus should be considered as 
crucial organisations providing core expertise on economic policy-making from within the 
centre-right party foundation networks. As only a relatively small number of such think 
tanks could be identified, some of the EU member states do not host any of them at all, as 
Table 3 shows.
Only eleven out of 28 EU member states host austerity think tanks connected to the 
European party foundations. Italy, France and the UK do not host a single one while 
Table 2. austerity think tanks within european party foundation networks.
notes: an = austerity network; source: own research based on think tank websites.44http://thinktanknetworkresearch.net/
wiki_ttni_en/index.php?title=category:austerity_politics.
  Political party foundation (n = 190) Population In AN* In AN* %
(1) new direction Foundation (ndF) 27 10 37%
(2) centre for european Studies (ceS) 30 6 20%
(3) european liberal Forum (elF) 38 5 13.1%
(4) Foundation for european Progressive Studies (FePS) 51 0 0%
(5) Green european Foundation (GeF) 17 0 0%
(6) transform! 27 0 0%
(7) total 190 21 11%
Table 3. european party foundation austerity think tanks.
Source: own research based on think tank websites: http://thinktanknetworkresearch.net/wiki_ttni_en.
Think tank Network Country
austrian economics center ndF austria
Hayek institute ndF austria
cedeR Study centre of cd&V Mc Belgium
institut economique Molinari ndF Belgium
Wilfried Martens center for european Studies ceS Belgium
adriatic institute for Public Policy ndF croatia
estat.cz ndF czech Republic
liberalni institute ndF czech Republic
Hanns Seidel Stiftung ceS Germany
institute for Free enterprise ndF Germany
Konrad adenauer Foundation ceS Germany
Friedrich naumann Foundation elF Germany
Forum for Greece elF Greece
Wetenschappelijk instituut voor het cda ceS netherlands
Fundacja industrial elF Poland
Fundacja Klub obywatelski elF Poland
conservative institute of M. R. Stefanik ndF Slovakia
civismo ndF Spain
Fundacion para el analisis y los estudios sociales (FaeS) ceS Spain
Galician Society for Freedom and democracy elF Spain
captus ndF Sweden
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Germany, Belgium and Spain are strongly represented. If we consider the CES and the ELF 
foundation networks only, then six countries with austerity think tanks remain (Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Poland and Spain).
Germany is a special case in this group. It is home to four of the 21 austerity think tanks 
listed in Table 3, and the three national party foundations are much larger organisations 
than the other member organisations of the party foundation networks. Because the German 
foundations have offices in many European states, their reach and potential influence within 
Europe is more transnational than that of think tanks lacking comparable capacities.
Almost half the austerity think tanks in the foundation networks are linked to New 
Direction Foundation. The formation of the new European political party ‘Alliance of 
Conservatives and Reformists’ in 2009 as a splinter party of the mainstream conservative 
‘European People’s Party’ was a consequence of a particular concern with austerity, which at 
the same time appears to be shared to a certain extent by the members of the conservative 
Centre for European Studies and of the liberal European Liberal Foundation. While the 
three centre-right think tank networks overlap when it comes to the austerity ideas they 
promote, there are few institutionalised personal relations between them, as the social 
network analysis of staff and board members shows. Two results stand out related to, first, 
links across networks and, second, to links within each individual network.
Firstly, only two individuals cross the networks of the Green European Foundation 
and the left Transform! Foundation, and only four individuals provide links between the 
conservative Center for European Studies Foundation and the right wing New Direction 
Foundation (see Table 7 in Annex – additional material online only). The latter can be con-
sidered surprising since many of the NDF affiliates used to be a part of the larger mainstream 
conservative camp. The near complete lack of personal linkages in centre-left think tanks 
deserves further scrutiny. The absence of links between think tanks across the left-right 
divide is less surprising. Only one individual could be found who has worked both as an 
expert for a think-tank related to the right-wing New Direction Foundation and the Social 
Democratic foundation. Individuals linked to the Liberal Foundation network are not active 
in think tanks that belong to other groups.
Secondly, only the Social Democratic think tank network and the New Direction 
Foundation network of market-liberal/conservative think tanks display a high number 
of interlocks within the network. The New Direction Foundation network in particular 
is closely interlinked by a large number of individuals who serve on two or more think 
tanks in different countries (Plehwe & Schlögl, 2014). This finding is an indicator of the 
degree of transnational integration of think tank networks. In terms of interlocks, the think 
tanks of the Green, Left, Conservative and Liberal networks display links to their own 
European Party foundation only, which seems to indicate a vertical and multi-national 
mode of organisation.
6. European partisan networks: Stockholm network and European ideas 
network
In addition to the think tank networks related to party foundations, two European think 
tank networks can be expected to prominently promote austerity perspectives. The first is 
the pro-market Stockholm Network, founded by Helen Disney in Britain in 1997. It has 
facilitated connected more than 100 organisations from across the EU and has coordinated 
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joint events such as the ‘European Resource Bank’ meetings. While the umbrella think tank 
Stockholm Network ceased publishing in 2010 when Disney left the organisation, it still 
has a presence and should be best considered a virtual network. Its members continue to 
be active – the next European Resource Bank meeting is to be held in Prague in 2018 – and 
many think tanks in this network pursue similar activities such as the ‘tax freedom day’ or 
contribute to the Economic Freedom of the World Index (Plehwe & Schlögl, 2014). Among 
the joint initiatives which emerged out of the Stockholm Network is the ‘nanny state index’ 
and the most recent ‘authoritarian populism index’ (Fischer & Plehwe, 2017). The second 
network to be discussed here is the European Ideas Network. It was created in 2002 by 
conservative Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who wanted it to promote ‘new 
thinking on the key challenges facing the […] EU’. It comprises 45 think tanks that provide 
an ‘important meeting-point and intellectual cross-roads for the centre-right in European 
politics’ (EIN, 2018). Stockholm and EIN networks thus emerged before the creation of the 
European political party foundation networks.
Given the overlapping membership between both networks, there is an expectation that 
between them a stronger degree of transnational integration exists compared to the party 
foundation networks. Table 4 provides an overview of the two networks and the share of 
austerity think tanks in each of them.
Relative to the number of think tanks in each of the eight networks considered in this 
research, EIN has the largest share of austerity think tanks (43%) followed by NDF (37%), 
the Stockholm Network (34%), ELF (15,8%) and CES (13%). Thus, we find a markedly 
higher share of austerity think tanks in the two partisan think tank networks and in the 
most right-wing network of the party foundations. This seems to indicate that austerity is 
of greater concern for the partisan networks and for the NDF party foundation network 
than for the mainstream conservative and liberal party networks.
The larger number of austerity think tanks in the Stockholm and EIN networks also 
translates into a wider distribution across EU member states (see Table 5). In addition to 
the eleven countries with austerity think tanks from the ranks of party foundation networks 
we find eight countries with austerity think tanks from Stockholm and EIN: UK, France 
Italy, Slovenia, Rumania, Lithuania, Denmark and from outside the EU, Switzerland. Many 
of the think tanks in these countries are members of both networks. France with four and 
both UK and Italy with five members are now strongly present on the austerity think tank 
map, though Belgium (7) and Germany (11) show the highest concentration.
Looking at the think tank networks of the party foundations only, there is limited overlap 
between right-wing NDF and the mainstream conservatives. Does the picture change once 
the Stockholm Network and EIN are taken into account? Table 6 provides an overview of 
cross-memberships of the different centre-right networks.
Table 4. Stockholm network and european ideas network think tank membership in austerity network 
(an).
Source: own research based on think tank websites: www.thinktanknetworkresearch.net/wiki_ttni_en
Think tank networks (n = 155) Population In AN In AN %
Stockholm-network (Sn) 119 40 34%
european ideas network (ein) 46 20 43%
total 155* 60 36%
POLICY AND SOCIETY  197
Ta
bl
e 
5.
 G
eo
gr
ap
hi
ca
l d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
of
 S
to
ck
ho
lm
 n
et
w
or
k 
an
d 
ei
n
 m
em
be
rs
.
n
ot
e:
 B
ol
d:
 m
em
be
rs
 in
 b
ot
h 
ne
tw
or
ks
.
So
ur
ce
: o
w
n 
co
m
pi
la
tio
n 
ba
se
d 
on
 d
at
a 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
p:
//
th
in
kt
an
kn
et
w
or
kr
es
ea
rc
h.
ne
t/
w
ik
i_
tt
ni
_e
n/
in
de
x.
ph
p?
tit
le
=
ca
te
go
ry
:a
us
te
rit
y_
po
lit
ic
s
Co
un
tr
y
St
oc
kh
ol
m
 n
et
w
or
k 
m
em
be
rs
EI
N
 m
em
be
rs
To
ta
l
Au
st
ria
au
st
ria
n 
ec
on
om
ic
s c
en
te
r
 
1
Be
lg
iu
m
ei
n
, e
ci
Pe
, i
ns
tit
ut
 e
co
no
m
iq
ue
 M
ol
in
ar
i, 
in
st
itu
te
 t
ho
m
as
 M
or
e,
 l
ud
w
ig
 v
on
 
M
is
es
 in
st
itu
te
 e
ur
op
e,
 W
or
k 
fo
r a
ll
ei
n
, e
ur
op
ea
n 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
in
st
itu
te
7
Cr
oa
tia
ad
ria
tic
 in
st
itu
te
 fo
r P
ub
lic
 P
ol
ic
y
 
3
Cz
ec
h 
Re
p.
li
be
ra
ln
i i
ns
tit
ut
e,
 c
en
tr
e 
fo
r e
co
no
m
ic
s a
nd
 P
ol
iti
cs
 (c
eP
)
eS
ta
t.c
z
3
D
en
m
ar
k
th
e 
co
pe
nh
ag
en
 in
st
itu
te
th
e 
co
pe
nh
ag
en
 in
st
itu
te
1
Fr
an
ce
Fo
nd
at
io
n 
po
ur
 l’
in
no
va
tio
n 
Po
lit
iq
ue
, i
ns
tit
ut
 M
on
ta
ig
ne
, c
iv
il 
So
ci
et
y 
in
st
itu
te
 
(iF
Ra
P)
Fo
nd
at
io
n 
po
ur
 l’
in
no
va
tio
n 
Po
lit
iq
ue
, i
ns
tit
ut
 M
on
ta
ig
ne
, F
on
da
tio
n 
Ro
be
rt
 
Sc
hu
m
an
4
G
er
m
an
y
St
ift
un
g 
M
ar
kt
w
irt
sc
ha
ft
, S
tif
tu
ng
 o
rd
nu
ng
sp
ol
iti
k,
 W
al
te
r e
uc
ke
n 
in
st
itu
t, 
in
st
itu
te
 fo
r F
re
e 
en
te
rp
ris
e,
 c
en
te
r f
or
 e
ur
op
ea
n 
Po
lic
y,
 c
ou
nc
il 
on
 P
ub
lic
 P
ol
ic
y,
 
H
am
bu
rg
 in
st
itu
te
 fo
r i
nt
er
na
tio
na
l e
co
no
m
ic
s, 
H
ay
ek
-G
es
el
ls
ch
af
t, 
n
ew
 S
oc
ia
l 
M
ar
ke
t e
co
no
m
y 
Fo
un
da
tio
n
H
an
ns
 S
ei
de
l S
tif
tu
ng
, K
on
ra
d 
ad
en
au
er
 S
tif
tu
ng
, S
tif
tu
ng
 M
ar
kt
w
irt
sc
ha
ft
, 
St
ift
un
g 
o
rd
nu
ng
sp
ol
iti
k,
 W
al
te
r e
uc
ke
n 
in
st
itu
t
11
Ita
ly
M
ag
na
 c
ar
ta
 F
ou
nd
at
io
n,
 in
st
itu
to
 B
ru
no
 l
eo
ni
, i
st
itu
to
 a
ct
on
, F
on
da
zi
on
e 
Re
sp
ub
lic
a
ce
nt
ro
 to
cq
ue
vi
lle
 a
ct
on
, F
on
da
zi
on
e 
Re
sp
ub
lic
a,
 M
ag
na
 c
ar
ta
 F
ou
nd
at
io
n
5
Li
th
ua
ni
a
li
th
ua
ni
an
 F
re
e 
M
ar
ke
t i
ns
tit
ut
e
 
1
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
 
W
et
en
sc
ha
pp
el
ijk
 in
st
itu
ut
 v
oo
r h
et
 c
d
a
1
Ru
m
an
ia
Ro
m
an
ia
n 
ce
nt
er
 fo
r e
ur
op
ea
n 
Po
lic
ie
s
Ro
m
an
ia
n 
ce
nt
er
 fo
r e
ur
op
ea
n 
Po
lic
ie
s
1
Sl
ov
ak
ia
in
st
itu
te
 fo
r e
co
no
m
ic
 a
nd
 S
oc
ia
l R
ef
or
m
s (
in
eK
o
), 
co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
in
st
itu
te
 o
f M
. R
. 
St
ef
an
ik
 
2
Sl
ov
en
ia
Jo
ze
 P
uc
ni
k 
in
st
itu
te
Jo
ze
 P
uc
ni
k 
in
st
itu
te
1
Sp
ai
n
Fa
eS
, c
iv
is
m
o
Fa
eS
2
Sw
ed
en
ti
m
br
o,
 c
ap
tu
s
ti
m
br
o
2
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
li
be
ra
le
s i
ns
tit
ut
 
1
U
K
Po
lic
y 
ex
ch
an
ge
, R
ef
or
m
, R
ef
or
m
 S
co
tla
nd
, c
iv
ita
s, 
ce
nt
re
 fo
r P
ol
ic
y 
St
ud
ie
s (
cP
S)
Po
lic
y 
ex
ch
an
ge
5
To
ta
l: 
17
 
 
51
198   D. PLEHWE ET AL.
A significant number of think tanks of the centre-right party foundation networks are 
members of the EIN and the Stockholm Network. The mainstream conservative think 
tanks overlap strongly with the European Ideas Network while many of the New Direction 
Foundation members also populate the Stockholm Network. Only European Liberal Forum 
does not overlap with Stockholm and EIN.
While it is not surprising that CES members are also part of the EIN due to overlapping 
groups of patrons such as conservative MEPs, many of the austerity think tanks of the EIN 
are not part of the official party foundation network of the CES. The EIN in fact appears 
to be geared more strongly to neoliberal perspectives than the political party foundation 
network of the mainstream conservatives. While few of the CES members are also part of 
the Stockholm Network, no less than 18 think tanks of the Stockholm Network are also 
members of the EIN.
A social network analysis of staff and board members yields further results (see Table 7 
in Annex – online only), as more than 700 interlock positions within the network formed by 
311 individuals are discovered. In other words, each individual holds two seats on average. 
However, some few individuals hold far more than two seats. With positions held at nine 
think tanks, the German philosopher and think tank veteran Hardy Bouillon is the individ-
ual who has the largest number of interlocking positions. He is followed by Leonard Liggio, 
Jürgen Donges and Karen Horn. All are members of the Mont Pelerin Society (Fischer & 
Plehwe, 2017; Walpen, 2004, compare Table 8 in Annex – online only).
In terms of staff and board member interlocks, the two partisan networks studied are 
similar to NDF and FEPS, but denser than the Transform!, Green European Foundation 
and Centre for European Studies networks. As a result of the personal interlock structure of 
the Stockholm, EIN and NDF networks, which account for the majority of austerity think 
tanks, austerity-related expertise as well as activities and discourses like the opposition to 
Eurobonds could be coordinated across borders (Plehwe, 2017).
7. Integrated analysis: the austerity think tank network
When all results are combined, Figure 1 shows that the austerity think tank network com-
prises members of three centre-right party foundation networks and two conservative-ne-
oliberal partisan think tank networks. In the Figure, the size of the circle corresponds to 
the size of the think tank network.
In contrast to the formal membership networks from which the think tanks come, the 
austerity network is a virtual network characterised by the principled defence and promo-
tion of austerity. The cosmos of centre-left party foundations is fully detached from that of 
austerity think tanks. On the right, all networks overlap. This is also reflected in the number 
Table 6. cross-membership of political foundation and partisan networks.
Source: own research based on think tank websites: http://thinktanknetworkresearch.net/wiki_ttni_en/index.php/catego-
ry:think_tank_network
Political foundations Stockholm network membership European ideas network membership
new direction Foundation (ndF) 10 2
european liberal Forum (elF) 0 0
centre for european Studies ceS) 1 11
total 11 13
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of interlocking staff or board memberships in centre-right networks. The strong overlaps 
between NDF, Stockholm and EIN are evidence for a struggle within the conservative main-
stream between the supporters of close cooperation, in the European Parliament, with Social 
Democrats and other centre-left actors and those who want to forge an alliance against the 
centre-left. The formation of the Stockholm and EIN networks precede the founding of the 
NDF, which lends previously existing conservative and neoliberal perspectives a stronger 
political significance.
While the networks related to the political party foundations are operating separately 
from each other, the partisan think tank networks provide space for actors to engage with 
each other across party lines on the right-wing of the political spectrum (See Figure 2 in 
Annex – online only). While the liberal, mainstream conservative and new right-wing 
conservative-neoliberal parties differ in many regards, they are closely aligned in terms 
of their austerity-focused economic and social policy perspectives. While partisan think 
tank networks such as the Stockholm Network are not directly involved in electoral com-
petition for office, they can provide space for politics beyond parties with the hope to align 
perspectives across party lines.
In addition to the strong overlap with regard to austerity ideas, think tanks related to 
the partisan networks and to the New Direction Foundation also rely on a large number of 
shared activists from staff and board. Many of the individuals who serve on two or more 
think tank boards belong to the Mont Pelerin Society. Mont Pelerin Society membership is 
therefore a good predictor of both austerity perspectives and involvement in the coordinated 
cross-border diffusion of ideas.
The analysis of the austerity think tank network fosters cognisance of the social forces 
in support of austerity across a number of countries, all located on the centre right-wing 
of the political spectrum, stretching from liberals to conservatives and neoliberals. But the 
analysis also raises questions because the distribution of austerity positions is not as clear-cut 
Figure 1. composition of the austerity think tank network. Source: own research based on think tank 
websites: http://thinktanknetworkresearch.net/wiki_ttni_en
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along the left-right divide as the analysed data suggest. For example, Germany’s Social 
Democrats embraced the debt break mechanism in 2009 in exchange for the stabilisation of 
Germany’s fiscal equalisation regime between the federal states (Bundesländer). The support 
for austerity perspectives of a political party and the lack of related expertise supplied by its 
party foundation and related think tanks suggests that other sources of expertise have to be 
considered in order to more fully explain the strength of austerity thinking.
One example is the ‘Agenda 2010’ welfare state reforms developed and implemented 
by the German Government, led by the Social Democratic Party in the early 2000s. The 
government advisor central to their development was Peter Hartz, a Social Democrat, 
member of IG Metall trade union and executive officer of Volkswagen, who was called 
to head an expert commission. As Pautz (2012) has shown, the experts involved in the 
Hartz Commission were based in academic and consulting circles (University of Potsdam, 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, McKinsey, Roland Berger), and were strongly supported by 
the Bertelsmann Foundation think tank. Neither of these actors belonged to the conserv-
ative-neoliberal networks analysed for this article. At least the question of who promotes 
pro-austerity perspective to Social Democratic leaders cannot be answered by studying the 
networks covered in this article. Leading Social Democrats in Germany can use expertise 
from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung think tank. However, they also can turn to advice from 
experts who belong to their personal network – e.g. experts in federal state-level govern-
ments where Social Democrats hold office – or they may see as trustworthy the opinions 
of prominent experts even if these are not associated with their party. These and possibly 
other options need to be subject to closer qualitative studies.
What can be said of the importance (in terms of recognition) of the think tanks studied 
in the sample here? Of the 57 austerity think tanks, we find 14 in McGann’s, 2015 survey of 
‘most important think tanks’, which does suggest they are not marginal. Global or European 
rankings at the same time tell little about national recognition of the smaller think tanks, 
of course. While the big German foundations are well-known beyond the home country, 
this is not necessarily the case for many other think tanks.
The limitation of the focus on networks studied here is nevertheless evident once the 
example of Germany is considered. No doubt, the list of members of the austerity network 
established so far is impressive. Germany has a larger number of austerity think tanks 
than any of the other countries and they are among the largest think tanks in Europe. Yet, 
there are a number of other think tanks in Germany that too would qualify as members of 
the austerity network. Among these are the Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft, 
Econwatch, Wilhelm Röpke Institute, Familienunternehmer and Deutsches Institut der 
Wirtschaft. However, they are not in the European networks examined above. Additionally, 
a number of academic think tanks have hosted prominent (public) intellectuals who have 
staunchly defended austerity principles – for example Hans Werner Sinn of the IFO institute. 
Lastly, in Germany’s key economic advisory institution, the German Council of Economic 
Experts, pro-austerity positions are well-represented (Heise, 2017; Pühringer, 2015).
8. Conclusions
This article has provided evidence for the transnational composition of a virtual network of 
austerity think tanks. It is made up of member think tanks of the networks of the mainstream 
conservative political party foundation, the Centre for European Studies, the mainstream 
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liberal party foundation, European Liberal Forum and in particular of the New Direction 
Foundation on the right. Many of these think tanks are also part of the neoliberal Stockholm 
Network and the European Ideas Network. Austerity think tanks are more numerous in the 
European partisan networks on the right, which preceded the formation of the European 
political party foundation networks. Altogether these forces account for a large part of the 
expert communities which support and promote austerity.
While the German share in the networks studied is stronger than that of any other 
EU member state, German economists cannot alone be responsible for the hegemony 
of austerity perspectives in the EU. The strongest support for austerity within the New 
Direction Foundation network has been orchestrated without a German political party 
foundation, for example. The German partner in this network is only a small think 
tank. There is no doubt that the support of austerity comes from many think tanks in 
many European countries and the think tank network analysis outlined in this article 
indicates that the UK, Spain and Sweden are strong nodes in the European pro-aus-
terity networks.
The lack of austerity think tanks in the Social Democratic and Green party foundation 
networks suggests a need to identify further significant expert sources in order to explain 
support for austerity perspectives from Social Democratic and Green parties. Further empir-
ical analysis should look elsewhere, too, in order to fully appreciate the forces behind the 
austerity message. Future analysis of the networks of intellectuals and think tanks behind 
austerity needs to add relevant organisations that are not part of the think tank networks 
investigated here, such as business association think tanks and academic institutions. A 
stronger focus on relevant individuals and authors in particular will help to further clarify 
the links between academics, think tank professionals, journalists, business leaders and 
political leaders complicit in austerity politics.
Theoretically, the findings of this article underline the need to take transnational 
networks and organisations into account to explain austerity capitalism. After all, both 
structural dimensions of globalised capitalism and powerful austerity ideas matter 
while they do not directly determine the evolution and struggles over austerity pol-
icies. Process-oriented studies are required to trace the formation of preferences and 
policies. This article suggests a need to take the interplay of party-related networks and 
partisan networks into account. Austerity perspectives and political positions change 
over time, of course, which requires attention to emerging configurations like the trans-
national European think tank networks. Last but not least, competing perspectives 
to that of austerity should be studied more thoroughly as most movements generate 
counter-movements.
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